"On 21 July 1970, in the
Chernomorskiy Shipyard, the largest Soviet shipyard,
situated in Nikolayev, the lead ship of Project 1143 was laid down — an
antisubmarine cruiser with aircraft armament, which was named Kiev. It
was intended to become the first Soviet aircraft carrier – i. e. a ship
designed for aircraft landings and take-offs directly from the deck. The
specific characteristics of this project were the result of a difficult intra-Soviet
compromise, which found expression in everything including classification. Post
factum, the definition 'antisubmarine cruiser with aircraft armament,' later
exchanged for 'heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser,' can be explained inter alia by
a desire, to avoid problems with passage through the Black Sea straits, but
these explanations are false: firstly, the Montreux Convention does not incorporate a direct ban on passage
through the straits of aircraft carriers of litoral Black Sea states; secondly,
in the Western classification (used among others by Turkey, which controlled
the straits), including the classification used in addendums to the Montreux
Convention, Kiev and its descendants were always clearly defined as
aircraft carriers.
"The reason for these
classification tricks was purely internal: it was impossible, in the context of
Soviet ideological reality, to announce directly the construction of ships that
were at the same time branded by the [Soviet] press as 'tools of aggressive
war.'
"To a large extent, the
same reasons defined the ship's characteristics: it was a hybrid that overcame
the hurdles put in its way by numerous opponents of aircraft carriers as a
vessel class. The hybrid was designed for the deployment of vertical take-off
and landing (VTOL) aircraft and helicopters, but with a cruiser's missile
munitions and the size of an 'aircraft carrier'. With a 37 thousand ton
standard displacement, a 273 meter length, and a 180 thousand horsepower steam
turbine propulsion system, Kiev could be placed somewhere between the
French Foch and Clemenceau-class aircraft carriers with a standard
displacement of approximately 30 thousand tons and a length of 265 meters, and
the 45 thousand ton American Midways.
"In contrast to those
ships, Kiev lacked a full deck – its bow contained cruiser fighting
equipment, which restricted its aircraft carrying capabilities to operating
VTOL aircraft, just like the much smaller British Invincible-class
ships, which were designed at that time.
"The biggest problems of
Project 1143 were related to the air group: the Yak-38, a subsonic VTOL plane
with weak weapons and a relatively small action radius, looked odd on a ship
equipped with anti-ship missiles with a range of up to 500 km. In fact, the
Yak-38, officially classified as a strike fighter, could not perform any of the
truly critical tasks: as a strike aircraft it was useless in anti-fleet
operations since it did not have missiles that would allow it to attack ships,
and as part of air defense forces its chances would be slim in a confrontation
with the enemy's strike machines operating under supersonic fighter cover.
"Kiev's shortcomings were obvious,
so new alternatives were considered.
'Any Detailed Development Of Project 1160 Was Never Started.
Instead Of A New Aircraft Carrier, It Was Decided To Continue Series 1143'
"The chief alternative
was the project assigned the number 1160. It contained some compromise
solutions, such as anti-ship missile launchers, but it was a full-fledged
aircraft carrier project. Nuclear propulsion system, 72 thousand ton standard
and 80 – full displacement, full deck,
an aircraft system that included an angled deck, four steam catapults,
and arresting gear – all this made it a fully functional analogue of American
super aircraft carriers.
"As for the air group,
there were plans to use MiG-23A Molniya (Lightning) aircraft (the deck-based
variant of the newest contemporary Soviet frontline fighter), Su-24K missile
bombers (the deck-based variant of a strike aircraft that was being developed
at the time), P-42 anti-submarine defense aircraft specially designed for
aircraft carriers by the Beriev design bureau, as well as 'flying radars' based
on the latter, and helicopters. As planes developed, plans changed: in 1973,
there were suggestions to use deck-based variants of Su-27 and MiG-29 that were
being developed then.
Project 1160 aircraft carrier, a variant (Source: Lenta.ru)
"The
creation of this ship required solving a number of process tasks, the chief of
which was the development of arresting gear and steam catapults – devices that Soviet
industry had not previously produced. There is no doubt that these systems
could be produced in 1970s – the USSR already disposed of all the necessary
technologies by that time.
"Nevertheless,
any detailed development of Project 1160 was never started. Instead of a new
aircraft carrier, it was decided to continue Series 1143. In 1972, another
Project 1143 ship was laid down — the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Minsk,
and in 1975 – Novorossiysk.
'The Navy Did Not Abandon The
Attempts To Obtain A Ship Capable Of Taking Conventional Take-Off And Landing Aircraft'
"Supporters
of the aircraft carrier idea, with the backing of ministers of defense and shipbuilding
industry and the interest of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian navy,
continued to propose new variants. In 1973, on the basis of the groundwork done
on Project 1160, the Nevskoye design bureau started developing Project 1153 –
an atomic CATOBAR (Catapult Take-off But Arrested Recovery) aircraft carrier
similar to 1160— with catapults and arresting gear but smaller in size and
cheaper, with two catapults instead of four. This project, however, was also
supposed to carry anti-ship missiles, and the air group was supposed to consist
of 50 aircraft (at 60 thousand ton standard displacement).
"The
building of the ship was supposed to start in 1978, but in 1976, the aircraft
carrier lobby lost two of its major figures: the minister of defense Andrey
Grechko died on April 26, and the minister of shipbuilding industry Boris Butoma
– on July 11. At the insistence of the new head of the military department,
Dmitri Ustinov, Series 1143 was extended with the fourth ship – heavy aircraft-carrying
cruiser Baku.
Project 1153 aircraft carrier, possible general view (Source: Lenta.ru)
"Nevertheless,
the navy did not abandon the attempts to obtain a ship tailored for conventional
take-off and landing aircraft. The Nevskoye design bureau began developing a
new aircraft carrier project, as near as possible to Project 1143 in general
ship systems – to remove at least the cost obstacle to the development of a new
ship.
"On
September 1, 1982, in the Chernomorskiy Shipyard, the fifth
ship of Project 1143 was laid down — heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Riga.
It was the result of a compromise between the desire to finally have a normal
aircraft carrier and the pressure of the 'anti-aircraft carrier' lobby that
consented only to modifications of Project 1143. From the technical perspective,
Project 1143.5 was a hybrid of preliminary work done in Project 1153 and the "Order"
research and development project, planted onto the source base of Project 1143.
"In
size, 1143.5 with its 55 thousand ton standard displacement was not much
smaller than 1153 and considerably larger than its predecessors. The large deck
and elevator area facilitated the use of heavy and large Su-27-based machines, but
catapults were removed from the project – instead, a ski-jump ramp was supposed
to be used to allow shorter take-off run.
"Gone
too was the nuclear propulsion system and instead, Riga (which soon
afterwards was renamed the Leonid Brezhnev, following the Secretary
General's death) got a steam turbine system consisting of four TB-12
geared-turbine units and eight KVG-4 boilers with a total capacity of 200
thousand horsepower. This variant of propulsion system determined the future of
the ship, which was renamed Tbilisi after its launching in 1985, and
then, in 1990, with the collapse of the USSR already on the horizon, — Admiral
Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov.
'In Order To Make The Creation Of
Aircraft Carriers Of The New Generation Possible, The Navy Must Keep And Repair
Admiral Kuznetsov'
"Admiral Kuznetsov could not help being a
problematic ship – its introduction into service coincided with the
disintegration of the country and was accompanied by serious organizational
problems, one of which was the uncertainty of its future: in autumn 1991,
Russian navy command seriously contemplated as a threat the scenario of the
ship being hijacked in Sevastopol by Ukrainian separatists who were rather
popular even in the Black Sea Fleet.
"The result was Kuznetsov's
secret and hasty departure from the Black Sea to the Northern Fleet, even
though some of the works had not yet been completed, including works on the
propulsion system.
"The ship's deployment
in the Kola Bay removed the worries over its nationality, but did not
contribute to its normal introduction to service: most of the technical experts,
whose absence rendered the aircraft carrier's maintenance highly problematic
remained at the Black Sea. Partially, these problems were solved by the fact
that heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers Kiev and Admiral Gorshkov
(until 1990 named Baku) were part of the Northern Fleet as well. They
had propulsion systems almost identical to that of Kuznetsov, but severe
reductions in military expenditures and the transfer of these ships from the
first line to the reserve with the accompanying crew size reduction did not
improve the situation.
"In 1993, the first
three ships of Project 1143 — Kiev and the Pacific Ocean-based Minsk
and Novorossiysk were withdrawn from the navy for good. In 1994, the
navy lost Admiral Gorshkov as well; by that time, it had been laid up
for repairs after a fire in the aft engine-boiler room. In Nikolayev, works on Kuznetsov's
sister ship – the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Varyag (laid down in
1985 under the name Riga and renamed in 1990) – were stopped. The last
ship of the 1143–1143.7 family, named Ulyanovsk, was scrapped in the
Nikolayev shipyard in 1993, when it was 20% ready. Further fate of these ships
was different in each case. The most interesting was the story of Gorshkov
and Varyag: the former, after a long reconstruction in Severodvinsk was
given to India in 2013 as the aircraft carrier Vikramaditya; the latter
was sold by Ukraine to China in 1998 at the price of scrap metal, and about 15
years later became the aircraft carrier Liaoning.
The launching of Riga, renamed Varyag (Source: Lenta.ru)
"As for Ulyanovsk, which
was laid down in 1988, when ideological dogmas were no longer a fixed part of
the Soviet military construction, it was the closest to a full-fledged aircraft
carrier – a hybrid with simultaneous use of a ski-jump ramp in the bows and
catapults on the angled deck; its large size and nuclear propulsion system made
it similar in its capabilities to the unimplemented projects 1160 and 1153, as
well as to American atomic aircraft carriers. However, it too had to carry
anti-ship missiles.
"In 1995, it was decided
to send Admiral Kuznetsov to the Mediterranean: the long-distance voyage
was timed to coincide with the 300th anniversary of the Russian navy
to be celebrated the year after. The first voyage could have been the last one
– the breakdown of the propulsion unit nearly resulted in the loss of the ship
during a storm. The aircraft carrier finished its voyage successfully and
returned to the Kola Bay, but the condition of the technical systems of the
engine-room department remains a source of major concern even now.
"Lack of funds for full
repairs in 1990s — early 2000s, coupled with the shortage of skilled experts,
made the ship's problems chronic. They could be partially solved by
cannibalization – removing necessary parts from Project 956 destroyers, which
used similar turbine-geared propulsion units and boilers; but this was not a
comprehensive solution. Power problems significantly reduce the ship's
performance, which affects the capabilities of its aircraft — for a take-off with
maximum takeoff weight (i.e. maximum fuel supply and payload), the ship needs
to put on full speed. The existing operating limitations result in a reduction of
fuel supply and payload, which affects the aircraft's combat performance.
Externally, the problems with the ship's propulsion system are expressed, among
other things, by excessive smoking in some modes – according to some experts,
the direct reason for smoke may be a defect of the automatic controls of the
main propulsion machinery, which makes using optimal fuel combustion modes impossible.
"Problems with the
propulsion system are only one part of Kuznetsov's shortcomings. The
infrastructure degradation that went on for a long time, the air group that was
always undermanned, and the general condition of the fleet that did not have
enough funds for full combat training until 2000s, – all this resulted in the
loss of a significant part of the aircraft carrier service experience acquired
with previous ships. Now, this
experience has to be acquired anew, but the only Russian aircraft carrier has
not grown any younger in the interim.
"The modernization and
repairs of Admiral Kuznetsov, scheduled for the next few years, should
fundamentally solve the ship's problems. But it's not enough to maintain
carrier-based aviation as a system. The Russian navy still needs planes capable
of providing cover for its deployment off the coast – primarily in order to
defend its own sea borders in the Arctic and in the Pacific Ocean. But in order
to make the creation of aircraft carriers of the new generation possible, the
navy must keep and repair Admiral Kuznetsov. In this realm, no other
source of human resources and technologies exists in Russia."
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