Russia’s policy toward the Islamic State (IS) group in the Middle
East is controversial. On the one hand, involvement in IS activities
officially became a crime in Russia in February 2015 (Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, February 27). On the other hand, Russia does not seem to have
taken the appropriate steps to stem the outflow of volunteer fighters to
the Middle East. Given the powers of the Russian state to control the
movement of its citizens, there are few if any indications that the
government is preventing people from going to the war torn region. A
recent investigative report by the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta
states that beyond failing to create obstacles for Russian citizens
seeking to go to Syria to fight, the Russian security services actually
contribute to the outflow. “They regard as a threat only those who try
to return from that war,” the newspaper wrote (Novaya Gazeta, July 29).
During his annual phone-in show on April 18, Russian President
Vladimir Putin said that IS did not pose a direct threat to Russia,
although the authorities were concerned about Russian and other
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries’ citizens traveling
to the Middle East and about the consequences of their potential return
back to Russia. “I cannot say that we know them [the IS recruits] all by
name, but we know their approximate number, where they fight, where
they train,” Putin said. “Some of them we actually know by name and the
security services are actively working on this issue” (Kremlin.ru, April
18).
It is unclear what the Russian security services are up to in the
Middle Eastern conflict. It follows from the Novaya Gazeta report that
some groups of militants in the Middle East, such as Jaish al-Muhajireen
wal-Ansar, have not even been outlawed by Russia. Jaish al-Muhajireen
wal-Ansar is primarily made up of Chechens, Dagestanis and other people
from CIS countries. Russian state agencies are notorious for scouring
the Internet for extremist materials. Yet, much of the IS propaganda in
Russian has been openly accessible, and the state agencies have shown
little interest in this fact. The Russian authorities are known to put
pressure on Muslims, but some preachers of IS ideology are operating
quite openly and freely, which is quite unthinkable in contemporary
Russia (Novaya Gazeta, July 29).
Thousands of people from Russia and other former Soviet states are
believed to be fighting in the Middle East now. Some Russian experts
have voiced concerns about a possible deterioration of the security
situation in the North Caucasus after the militants start returning to
the region. However, so far the situation in the region has actually
become quieter, and there is a simple explanation for that. According to
the well-known Russian expert on Islam, Aleksei Malashenko, officials
from Dagestan traveled to Syria specifically to convince the Dagestani
militants who are fighting there to stay in the Middle East and refrain
from returning back home (Kavkazsky Uzel, March 13).
The Novaya Gazeta article also has extremely credible evidence of the
new government policy designed to export Islamists from Russia to the
Middle East. According to the newspaper, several leaders of the
underground movement in the village of Novosasitl, in Dagestan’s
Khasavyurt district, reached an agreement with the Federal Security
Service (FSB), which allowed them to receive foreign passports and
secure safe passage to Turkey and then on to Syria. Among them was the
so-called amir of the Northern Sector of the Caucasus Emirate who,
officially, is dead, but in reality, according to the report, went to
Turkey. The Russian security services routinely offer “agent agreements”
in exchange for safe passage to Syria, Novaya Gazeta writes. Instead of
solving the pressing social issues that propelled the armed underground
movement, such as corruption and the lack of social mobility and
opportunity, the government in Dagestan has adopted a new
strategy—exporting militants to the Middle East (Novaya Gazeta, July
29). The strategy is remarkably similar to the centuries-old Russian
strategy in the Caucasus, when the Tsarist authorities promoted the mass
emigration of the unwanted populations. Even the destination of such
forced emigrations remains the same—Turkey and the Middle East.
By allowing and promoting the emigration of Islamists, Russian
authorities achieve several aims. They clear the volatile North Caucasus
of Islamists and reduce violence in the country. The export of
militants to the Middle East also serves Russian foreign policy goals,
most principally to cause as much volatility in the Middle East as
possible in order to drive up oil prices. High oil prices are
practically the only way for the current Russian regime to survive in
the long run. What appears to be a widespread practice in Russia, “agent
agreements” signed between the Russian security services and Islamist
recruits amounts to the Russian state recruiting militants for militant
organizations in the Middle East. This policy of creating problems for
neighboring countries, while having an Islamic underground movement on
Russia’s own territory, is likely to backfire sooner or later. Even
though Russia temporarily “solves” its problem in the North Caucasus and
creates headaches for others in the Middle East, this strategy is
unlikely to lead to a long-term solution for either of these regions.
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