Japan Launches New Helicopter Destroyer

The Izumo class helicopter carrier.

Image Credit: militarytoday.com

Japan launched its second Izumo-class helicopter carrier, the largest warship built by the country since World War II, media sources reported August 27.

The 24,000-ton ship, named Kaga, was unveiled at Japan Marine United shipyard in Yokohama. The name Kaga, derived from former Kaga province in present-day Ishikawa Perfecture, originally belonged to a WWII aircraft carrier that took part in the Pearl Harbor attacks and was lost at the Battle of Midway. The ship is expected to be commissioned in March 2017.

Kaga is the second Izumo-class carrier to be launched, with the first being JS Izumo which was launched in August 2013 and commissioned in March 2015. According to IHS Jane’s, both vessels are nearly identical. Details provided by Japan Marine United suggest the only differences are a draught of 7.1 m rather than 7.3 m, and a complement of 520 rather than 470. Both vessels displace 19,500 tons (24,000 tons at full load), and Kaga will likely also be armed with two Raytheon Sea RAM RIM-116 systems and two Mk 15 Vulcan Phalanx close in weapons systems.

At first glance, the Izumo-class helicopter carrier – officially designated a “helicopter destroyer” – resembles an aircraft carrier. The ships can carry up to 14 helicopters designed for anti-submarine warfare or mine countermeasures. Some have also noted that it is capable of accommodating vertical takeoff platforms such as the F-35B and V-22 Osprey given the large size of the ships, relative to the smaller 18,300-ton Hyuga-class helicopter carriers already in operation. Its features have led some to conclude that it is meant singularly or primarily for direction against China, specifically for anti-submarine warfare.

Japanese defense officials have admitted that this is indeed one role for these new helicopter carriers. Indeed, an officer from the Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces told Asahi Shimbun in March that the ships “heightens our ability to deal with Chinese submarines that have become more difficult to detect.”

At the same time, officials have also gone out of their way to emphasize the multi-purpose nature of the vessel – especially its peacetime roles. They have stressed repeatedly that the features of the Izumo-class helicopter carrier, including its high command and control capability, would be useful not only in wartime but also for rescue missions and natural disasters. This is important not only for disasters which hit Japan, but also other neighboring countries since Japan often plays an important role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, with a recent example being Typhoon Haiyan which hit the Philippines 2013.

Given its various functions, some have argued that it is more useful to think about the Izumo-class helicopter carriers more broadly as platforms for power projection rather than narrowly for anti-submarine warfare directed against China.

“In this sense, the Izumo is…intended as a platform for power projection. It is designed to offer the option to expand fleet air defense or support short-distance amphibious raids. Izumo maximizes a variety of functions, from ASW to HADR, showing the extent of Japan’s seriousness as a responsible stakeholder in international security,” Alessio Patalano, a naval expert at King’s College in London told DefenseNews earlier this year.

Once the Kaga is commissioned, Japan will have a total of four helicopter carriers, with the Izumo in addition to the two Hyuga-class carriers.

http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/japan-launches-new-helicopter-destroyer/ 

A Military Game of Chicken in the South China Sea?

The littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) conducts routine patrols in international waters of the South China Sea near the Spratly Islands in May 2015.

Image Credit: U.S. Navy/flickr

Despite China’s protestations against discussing the issue, the South China Sea was front and center at this month’s meetings between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional players in Kuala Lumpur. Amid criticisms of China’s island-reclamation activities, the U.S. and China continued to trade accusations that the other is militarizing the South China Sea. Meanwhile, China maintained its objection, to no avail, to internationalizing the South China Sea issue through the involvement of non-ASEAN members.

The ship has sailed on both fronts. Now, more than ever, the South China Sea has become both a military and international issue. Given how all parties appear to have dug deeper into their positions, the situation looks unlikely to change anytime soon.

While Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi told his ASEAN counterparts that China has halted its reclamation of artificial islands on atolls and reefs in disputed parts of the Spratly Islands, it is proceeding with the construction of military installations on some of those islands.

Alarmed by the unprecedented scale on which China has conducted its reclamation activities (and is seeking to project force from these reclaimed features), the U.S., the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and others have engaged in a flurry of maritime patrols and joint exercises. The Chinese navy itself recently conducted large-scale air and sea drills, although it states that those were routine drills planned far in advance and not aimed at any third parties.

Southeast Asian countries are also building up their maritime military capabilities as part of a broader trend of increased defense spending in the region. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, defense expenditures in Southeast Asia rose by 44 percent, in real terms, between 2005 and 2014, reaching $35.9 billion in 2014. Vietnam, whose territorial claims overlap the most with China among all Southeast Asian claimants, increased its defense spending by 128 percent during this period and by 9.6 percent in 2014 alone.

Efforts to manage and contain tensions in the South China Sea are also now involving players beyond the territorial claimants—China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei—and, for that matter, ASEAN, which is still negotiating a code of conduct with China.

The U.S. involved itself several years ago, when then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said at an ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi in July 2010 that the United States has a “national interest” in freedom of navigation and would be willing to facilitate multilateral talks on the South China Sea issue.

Japan, which is involved in a territorial dispute with China in the East China Sea, has lent its political support to Vietnam and the Philippines, has proposed to participate in surveillance patrols in the area, has provided a patrol vessel to Vietnam and may do likewise to the Philippines—actions that could threaten Japan’s tenuous rapprochement with China. Australia, India and most recently, Britain, have also voiced concerns about the situation in the South China Sea.

Given the $5 trillion in global trade that passes through the South China Sea, the international attention is unsurprising, especially if the ability to navigate vital shipping routes could be compromised. However, the varying definitions of “freedom of navigation,” particularly as it relates to permitted (especially military) activities in exclusive economic zones (EEZs), have been an ongoing source of contention, prompting China to articulate its position on the limits to freedom of navigation following the ASEAN meetings.

Between the U.S. and China, such differences have already given rise to several dangerous incidents at sea and in the air over the years. These include the deadly collision between a U.S. navy EP-3 surveillance plane and a Chinese J-8 fighter jet in 2001, the 2009 harassment of the USNS Impeccable by Chinese vessels, and more recently, the buzzing of a U.S. navy P-8 plane by a Chinese J-11 fighter jet in 2014. (All these episodes occurred off the coast of Hainan.)

Even as external parties have become more vocal about their concerns, they have made it a point to distinguish between taking an interest in managing the situation and choosing sides on the territorial claims themselves. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel drew that distinction when he remarked that the U.S. remains neutral about the merits of the sovereignty claims but is “not neutral” when it comes to the resolution of disputes in accordance with international law. Yet he has also shown how delicate that balance is, having previously publicly questioned the legal validity of the nine-dashed line, which forms the basis of China’s territorial claims.

A greater source of potential conflict is what now appears to be an increasing propensity of all parties to turn to military deterrence to defend their interests in the South China Sea. This trend will be difficult to reverse as long as each side perceives others to be raising the stakes—which makes the implementation of maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs) all the more important at this juncture.

The most significant CBM would be a binding code of conduct between ASEAN and China, negotiations on which are proceeding slowly. On the more immediate front, China and ASEAN are reportedly in discussions to establish a hotline to deal with emergencies in the South China Sea. The United States and China are making good on their November 2014 agreements on two sets of military confidence-building measures, regarding the notification of major military activities and rules of behavior for air and maritime encounters. As part of this process, both governments are aiming to agree on an annex on air-to-air encounters by September 2015, to complement the rules on at-sea encounters that have already been agreed upon.

More broadly in the region, the U.S., Chinese and other navies have begun practicing the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea during joint exercises or routine maritime operations.

But CBMs alone are not sufficient if the default position is still to undertake risky behavior. Such risky behavior could be in the form of reckless or aggressive actions by vessel crew that lead to inadvertent conflict. Tensions could also escalate when parties act on threat assessments based on suspicion or a lack of clarity regarding the other’s strategic intentions.

In short, CBMs that seek to avoid or mitigate the risk of maritime clashes need to be accompanied by efforts to facilitate an environment that constrains the tendency for conflict. Such efforts could include: toning down inflammatory rhetoric and breaking the vicious cycle of alternately ratcheting such rhetoric up and down; encouraging constructive behavior, or at least discouraging (or refraining from) provocative behavior (the latter is formalized in the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea); and maintaining open channels of communication through which all sides are willing to explain their respective positions on the issues and talk to, not past, one another.

As the meetings in Malaysia showed, those are tougher to materialize: Harsh rhetoric abounded, and the countries could not agree on the halting of provocative actions. Yet, an alternative would be a much more dangerous scenario that would allow such differences to play out in a game of military “chicken” in and above increasingly crowded waters.

http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/a-military-game-of-chicken-in-the-south-china-sea/

U.N. Agency Says Iran May Have Built Extension at Parchin Nuclear Site

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano / Reuters

A report from the U.N. agency tasked with inspecting Iran’s nuclear facilities indicates that since May, the country may have built an extension to its Parchin military site believed to have housed nuclear arms testing.

In the document, obtained by Reuters, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discloses that vehicles, equipment and construction materials have moved through a location at the Parchin nuclear site in recent months.

“Since [our] previous report [in May], at a particular location at the Parchin site, the agency has continued to observe, through satellite imagery, the presence of vehicles, equipment, and probable construction materials,” the report explains. “In addition, a small extension to an existing building appears to have constructed.”

According to an unnamed senior diplomat familiar with the IAEA probe into the military complex, the changes to the site were first noticed in July, the same month that Iran and world powers finalized the nuclear agreement.

The IAEA is responsible for ensuring that Iran abides by the stipulations in the nuclear deal. The U.N. agency and Iran have brokered secret side agreements to the larger deal that govern the inspections of Iran’s nuclear sites as well as the extent to which Tehran must admit to the details of its alleged nuclear weapons program.

According to the Associated Press, the recent IAEA report also suggests that “activities” at Parchin over the last several years may well prevent the agency from conducting “effective verification” of the country’s nuclear work.

“The activities that have taken place at this location since February 2012 are likely to have undermined the agency’s ability to conduct effective verification,” the report reads.

The IAEA has received data from member states that suggests that Parchin may have been used for hydrodynamic experiments to analyze how certain materials react under high pressure like that generated by a nuclear blast.

According to the anonymous senior diplomat, the IAEA is unable to “speculate” on the contents of the apparent building extension at Parchin.

“We cannot know or speculate what’s in the [extended] building. The building itself is not related to the most interesting building for us. … It’s something we will technically clarify over the course of the year,” said the diplomat.

Last week, an apparent draft of one of the secret side deals between Iran and the IAEA indicated that Tehran will be permitted to use its own experts to inspect the Parchin site. While the IAEA dismissed the report regarding the draft of the agreement a “misrepresentation,” a senior State Department official refused to deny that Iran will “play a role” in the inspections.

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-n-agency-says-iran-may-have-built-extension-at-parchin-nuclear-site/

Russia and China Kick Off Naval Exercise in Sea of Japan

This week, Russia and China have begun a naval exercise – dubbed Joint Sea II- in international territorial waters in the Sea of Japan and off the coast of Russia’s Primorsky territory – approximately 250 miles away from Japan. The exercise for the first time includes a joint Sino-Russian amphibious assault drill.

The war games, which are scheduled to conclude on August 28, include 22 vessels, 20 aircraft, 40 armored vehicles and 500 marines, according to RT.

“During the active phase of the maritime maneuvers to last till August 27, the sailors work out the issues of join anti-sabotage, anti-submarine, anti-vessel and anti-aircraft defense. Besides that there’ll be gunnery drills with different types of surface, underwater and aerial targets,” Roman Martov, Russia’s Eastern Military District spokesman, told TASS.

The naval exercise – themed “Joint maritime transportation protection and joint landing missions” – will conclude with an amphibious and airborne landing of Russian and Chinese troops at the Cape Klerk firing range in the southern Primorye Territory. “It’s [the] first time ever such an operation is to be held on the Russian soil,” Martov added. It is also the first time that People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) units are participating in military drills in the Sea of Japan.

As I reported earlier, in May 2015, China and Russia held a much smaller naval drill code-named Joint Sea 2015 that involved nine ships from both countries in the Mediterranean Sea. The navies conducted live-fire drills, underway replenishment and escort operations

The naval maneuvers “showed that Russian and Chinese seamen can effectively fulfill tasks in such a difficult region as the Mediterranean Sea,” according to the Russian Navy’s Deputy Commander-in-Chief Vice Admiral Aleksandr Fedotenkov.

“Unlike many other war games staged in the Asia-Pacific region, the Joint Sea series focus on emergency response under multiple circumstances, instead of simulating an offensive against a third party,” according to a Xinhua commentary. “As for the far-fetched idea of an emerging China-Russia military alliance, it seems that only the most insensible ones could buy,” the commentary noted.

The naval drill currently taking place aims to bolster equipment interoperability between the two navies, and despite Chinese and Russian claims to the contrary, it is also meant to send a clear political signal to the United States and its allies in the region that Sino-Russian military ties are deepening. Beijing and Moscow have held regular joint naval drills since 2011.

http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/russia-and-china-kick-off-naval-exercise-in-sea-of-japan/

Russia Engages in Military Drills on Europe’s Doorstep

Russia and its military partners across Asia have been busy practicing. While the Russian Navy is engaging in exercises with China in the Sea of Japan (which The Diplomat’s Franz-Stefan Gady covered here), its air force has been exercising with units from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)’s Rapid Reaction force (CRRF) is also engaging in exercises. While the CSTO exercises are an annual event, this year’s location has drawn increased attention.

Cooperation 2014 unfolded in Kazakhstan, attended by over 3,000 soldiers from Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, focused on “psychological and cyber warfare for the first time.”

The 2015 edition is being staged in Pskov, a city in western Russia less than 25 miles from the Estonian border. According to the CSTO, about 2,000 soldiers are participating, with 200 vehicles and 40 aircraft and helicopters. Half of the troops participating are Russian. Kazakhstan reportedly sent a nuclear, chemical, and biological defense unit comprising of about 70 soldiers. Kyrgyzstan sent 50 soldiers and Tajikistan sent a platoon.

According to CSTO’s statement, the CRRF “will conduct a joint operation to localize an armed conflict with the aim of restoring territorial integrity and defending constitutional order in a simulated CSTO member state, working out tasks for destroying irregular armed formations.” RFE/RL reported that Russian General Vladimir Shamanov, who is overseeing Cooperation 2015, said the drills would practice “localizing an armed conflict and eliminating illegal armed formations in the Eastern European region.”

Although this year’s exercise is smaller, the choice of location, along with the declared focus of the drills, is provocative due to ongoing tensions with Europe over Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. One European think tank pointed out in a recent report that both NATO and Russia’s patchwork of Eurasian alliances are training to fight each other:

Whilst spokespeople may maintain that these operations are targeted against hypothetical opponents, the nature and scale of them indicate otherwise: Russia is preparing for a conflict with NATO, and NATO is preparing for a possible confrontation with Russia.

The six-day CSTO exercises kicked off on August 23. Shamanov said that after the exercises, the participating soldiers and equipment will be redeployed to Russia’s Astrakhan region for further training.

Meanwhile, the CIS are also engaging in exercises in Russia, called Combat Commonwealth 2015, according to Sputnik. The first phases of joint air defense drills began on August 18. The Russian defense ministry said that about 20 air defense and missile defense units would be participating, including over 1000 troops, 200 units of equipment including S-400 “Triumf” and S-300 “Favorit” anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as MiG-29s, MiG-31s, a fleet of Sukhoi multirole fighters, and helicopters. The first phase is scheduled to end on September 11 at which point the units will be redeployed, also to Astrakhan.

TASS reported Friday that Russian air defense and Air Force units were expected to take part in “major exercises” in the country’s southern military district, which is centered in the north Caucasus, including both the Caspian flotilla and Black Sea fleet. Crimea, annexed by Russia in April 2014, is a de facto part of this district as well.

The district’s press service reported that “Preparations for large-scale Air Force and air defence war games, which will be held at the end of September and will involve missile launches, are nearing completion in the Southern Military District… The drill assignments will presuppose operations with the aid of Igla shoulder-carried missile launchers, Tunguska antiaircraft gun complexes, Shilka antiaircraft missile launchers, as well as S-300, Buk M1-2, Strela-10, Tor, and Osa.”

While the CIS is a loose association, it has maintained a council of defense ministers and established an air defense system in the mid-1990s. The CSTO began as an outgrowth from the CIS, and was established in 2002 as a military alliance. The CSTO’s rapid reaction force has been exercising near many of he region’s hotspots, in Tajikistan in May simulating fending off a Taliban invasion and now near Europe. Central Asia’s troop presence at such exercises is small relative to Russia’s, but participating helps reinforce the region’s links to Russia.

In related news, Tengrinews reports that Kazakhstan’s ministry of defense says that Moscow gave Astana five missile defense systems for free.

“These S300PS air defence missile systems will be tested during live fire exercise and transferred to military bases of Kazakhstan’s Air Defence Forces to be in operation readiness covering the airspace of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” the Commander of Kazakhstan’s AA Troops Nurzhan Mukanov said.

http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/russia-engages-in-military-drills-on-europes-doorstep/ 

Six killed by female suicide bomber in Damaturu

A young female suicide bomber on Tuesday killed at least six people and injured up to 28 others outside the main bus station in the northeastern Nigerian town of Damaturu, witnesses and an official said.

No group or individual has claimed responsibility but Boko Haram Islamists have in the past months used young women to carry out bloody suicide attacks in the restive northeast of the country.

“A young girl came around at 7:00 am (0600 GMT) and wanted to enter the bus station. She was denied entry because she refused to be searched by the security guards at the entrance,” a witness, Sani Dankamasho, told AFP.

A spokesman of the government of Yobe state, whose capital is Damaturu, confirmed the attack but gave a death toll of five.

“There was a suicide bombing in Damaturu…this morning where five people were killed from the explosion with more than 20 other victims injured,” Abdulahhi Bego said in a statement.

“The dead have been evacuated to a mortuary while the injured victims are currently being attended to by health and emergency workers,” the statement said.

Accoding to Dankamasho, the girl “stepped out of the park. A private taxi then drove out of the park. As soon as the car came close, she detonated the explosive. Six people in the car were killed. She was also killed,” he said.

A journalist working for a major private newspaper in Damaturu, who arrived at the scene shortly after the blast, also confirmed the death toll of six.

“Six people were killed as a result of the blast, all from the car. The bomber was also killed,” said the reporter, who demanded anonymity.

Boko Haram has stepped up attacks in three states in its northeastern heartland since President Muhammadu Buhari came to power on May 29, vowing to crush the group.

The Islamists have also carried out deadly ambushes across Nigeria’s borders and in recent weeks suicide bombers, many of them women, have staged several attacks in Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad.

http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/08/six-killed-by-female-suicide-bomber-in-damaturu-yobe-state/

Air operations but no strategy against the Islamic State

News that the Pentagon’s Inspector General is investigating claims that intelligence documents assessing the success of American air strikes against Islamic State (IS) targets in Iraq were ‘handled’ to give a more ‘optimistic account’, should send shivers of trepidation through the corridors of power of any allied government considering active involvement in air operations against IS targets in Syria. Not so in Canberra. National security fever has yet again gripped the Australian capital as the media awaits confirmation of Australia’s new commitment to help Washington eliminate what Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott calls a ‘death cult’.

Prime Minister Abbott has again shown the pattern of predictable behaviour of a leader whose political fortunes are flagging. Unable to come to grips with complex and controversial social issues at home, Abbott has consistently used national security as a way of rallying people around him in his time of need. Whether it’s the threat of IS-inspired terrorists lurking among Australia’s Muslim communities, or the threat posed by the ideology of IS in the Middle East, Australia is always first among America’s allies who wants to be seen to be doing something, even when the something that actually nothing at all. Today (Aug. 26, 2015), allegations were made in the Australian media that Prime Minister Abbott, eager to be seen to lead from the front in the war against IS, ‘volunteered’ Australia’s Air Task Group in Iraq for operations supporting the American air campaign in Syria. The Prime Minister was quick to deny this, suggesting that President Obama was the one who had approached him for Australian support. However, senior government officials told Fairfax Media that it was Abbott’s office which drove Australia’s offer of support, not the White House. Whether this was the situation or not, what is sure is that by early September, Australia’s Air Task Group Iraq may be striking targets within Syria, and from almost any perspective, this is neither a wise nor an effective move.

Australia’s Air Task Group in Iraq was dedicated to bombing IS targets inside Iraq, not Syria. It is a small contingent consisting of some eight aircraft, six classic F/A-18 Hornet fighters, one E-7A airborne warning and control aircraft and one KC-30A multirole tanker/transport plane. By international military standards, this is not a large force and while it has provided some tactical utility in eroding IS paramilitaries in Iraq as far as we can assess, splitting this force between Iraqi and Syrian missions will add no weight to the existing American air campaign in Syria and will certainly impact on the RAAF’s existing mission parameters in Iraq, unless the Abbott government agrees to increase the size of the RAAF’s overall commitment to Middle East missions. Considering the parlous state of the Australian economy, this would be financially irresponsible at a time when fiscal restraint is called for. Deploying even a small batch of high-tech forces far from Australian shores and then sustaining them indefinitely, is expensive. So the question that needs to be raised is, what is the Australian taxpayer’s return on investment? The destruction of the death cult of IS? No air campaign has ever won a war in its own right. Aerospace technology is a potent force when used in combination with land and sea power, but never has it shown such decisive effect that it alone can defeat a ground based enemy. It is unlikely that the American mission over Syria will change this historic fact and Australia’s role in this campaign, minor as it is likely to be, becomes just another expensive symbolic gesture designed to make Australia look relevant to American interests.

http://www.sageinternational.com.au/personal-observations/air-operations-but-no-strategy-against-the-islamic-state/